cistercian TOPICS
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CONSTITUTIONS
AND
LINGUISTICS (Various
types
of
value
statements
in
our
Constitutions) [Enter Viola and Clown with
a
tabor] VIOLA:
Save
thee,
friend,
and
thy
music:
Dost
thou
live
by
thy
tabor? CLOWN:
No,
sir,
I
live
by
the
church. VIOLA:
Art
thou
a
churchman? CLOWN:
No
such
matter,
sir;
I
do
live
by
the
church,
for
I
do
live
at
my
house,
and
my
house
doth
stand
by
the
church. (Twelfth Night, Act 3,
Scene
1) * * * The above dialogue between Shakespeare's fools
is
perhaps
a
good
illustration
of
the
dialogue
that
has
been
going
on
in
the
Order
this
past
few
years
concerning
questions
like
the
Unity
of
the
Order
and,
of
course,
Collegiality. The various persons of the Order who have
proposed
solutions
on
these
matters
all
share
the
same
fundamental
values
and
the
same
sincere
desire
to
find
an
adequate
manner
of
expressing
those
values
in
our
legislation.
The
problem
is,
to
a
very
large
extent
a
problem
of
language;
but
not
only
in
the
sense
that
we
don't
give
exactly
the
same
meaning
to
the
same
words. It has to do with the nature of the statements
we
use.
The
study
of
philosophy
and
linguistics
during
the
last
half
century
or
so
has
taught
us
to
discriminate
among
linguistic
forms.
[1]
Value statements (and it is mostly
what
we
are
dealing
with
in
our
Constitutions)
can
be
divided
into
two
kinds:
general
or
consensual
statements
on
the
one
hand,
and
specific
or
substantive
statements
on
the
other. General or consensual statements are the sort
of
things
to
which
one
can
hardly
take
exception. They express general notions like "Seek
peace
and
pursue
it",
"We
must
foster
by
all
means
the
unity
of
the
Order",
"We
must
foster
democracy
in
Policies are pragmatic; there are always choices
between
two
or
more
optional
directions,
each
claiming
to
fulfil
the
mandates
of
the
generally
accepted
wisdom
that
the
consensual
statements
represent. A specific or substantive statement
is
precisely
a
statement
that
is
concrete
enough
to
lead
to
the
formulation
of
an
actual
policy.
Examples
would
be:
"In
order
to
pursue
peace
such
and
such
an
ideology
must
be
eradicated";
"The
Unity
of
the
Order
must
be
achieved
through
totally
unified
structures
(or
through
parallel
structures);
"To
foster
democracy
in
It is obvious that it is easier to agree on
the
first
type
of
statements
than
on
the
second,
for
the
very
good
reason
that
the
first
ones
are,
by
nature,
expressions
of
consensus
while
the
second
express
"positions"
on
disputable
matters. From this I would like to draw a few conclusions:
The
first
one
is
that,
at
this
point,
when
we
are
putting
a
finishing
touch
to
our
Constitutions
and
a
few
important
questions
remain
to
be
settled,
it
might
be
useful
to
divide
our
statements
into
two
columns.
The
advantage
of
doing
this
will
be
that
we
will
not
be
tempted
to
withdraw
an
obvious
and
important
consensual
statement
because
we
cannot
agree
on
a
specific
one
that
tries
to
give
it
a
concrete
expression.
It
might
also
help
us
to
keep
a
good
balance
of
both
types
of
statements.
If
we
choose
mostly
the
consensual
statements,
no
tension
will
be
generated,
but
we
will
arrive
at
no
clear
policy
of
our
concrete
life.
On
the
other
hand,
if
we
choose
mostly
substantive
statements,
we
will
get
clear
guidelines
for
action
but
no
consensus
on
enforcing
them. For example, the following statements from
our
Constitutions
all
seem
to
me
consensual
statements: 1 ‑ "The Cistercian way of life
is
coenobitic."
(Cst.
3,1) 2 ‑ "Nothing is to be preferred
to
the
Work
of
God."
(Cst.
10) 3 ‑ "The supreme authority of the
Order...
is
exercised
collegially
by
the
superiors,
who
share
a
responsibility
for
all
the
communities
of
the
Order."
(Cst.
4,
2) On the other hand, the following statements
are
substantive
or
specific
statements: 1 ‑ "The abbot... may permit a
brother
to
take
up
an
eremitical
life."
(Cst
14,
2,
A) 2 ‑ "It is the abbot's responsibility...
to
determine
the
manner
in
which
each
monk
participates
[the
Work
of
God]."
(Cst.
20) 3 ‑ "Matters affecting both monks
and
nuns
together
are
referred
to
the
pastoral
care
and
authority
of
the
abbots
and
abbesses
gathered
in
General
Chapter
either
jointly
or
separately."
(Cst.
73,
2
[Nuns]) The next step is what to do with these statements: What to do about our specific statements:
There
are
some
disputed
points
on
which
we
will
probably
be
able
to
arrive
at
some
agreement
or
at
least
at
some
reasonable
compromise
at
the
Summit
Meeting.
If
we
do,
all
the
better.
There
are
other
questions
on
which
no
solution
has,
in
the
present
state
of
things,
the
qualities
required
to
generate
a
collective
agreement.
These
questions
should
be
left
open
or,
to
use
an
expression
put
forward
these
past
few
years,
they
should
be
left
in
a
state
of
evolutive
status
quo. To force those issues could endanger our agreement
on
the
consensual
statements
and,
consequently,
our
common
value
stances. To generate value stances is precisely
the
main
reason
for
the
expression
of
value
statements. As linguists point out, consensual statements
do
not
actually
state
anything,
in
the
sense
of
making
an
assertion
that
is
open
to
assent
or
denial.
As
in
liturgy,
we
are
dealing
not
so
much
with
words
of
a
text
as
with
the
experience
of
those
words
when
they
are
read
or
repeated. The repetition of those value statements may
never
lead
to
a
concrete
common
policy;
but
they
can
generate
a
common
value
stance.
Let's
take
an
example:
When
we
say
that
the
abbots
and
abbesses
of
the
Order
share
a
collegial
responsibility
on
the
whole
Order,
we
express
a
general
or
consensual
statement
that,
if
we
put
it
in
our
Constitutions,
and
read
it
periodically,
will
help
maintain
and
develop
a
"collegial
attitude",
whether
or
not
we
ever
come
to
an
agreement
on
specific
and
substantial
statements
like
"the
abbots
and
the
abbesses
of
the
Order
form
a
permanent
college". The comparison with liturgy, which I made
above,
is
worth
stressing.
Therefore
I
would
like
to
conclude
with
a
quotation
from
a
Jewish
liturgist: "A value stance arises out of the interaction
of
worshipers
with
a
text,
during
the
act
of
prayer. Out of their commitment to praying together
as
a
community
that
embodies
certain
traditions
and
attitudes
toward
the
world,
there
are
formulated
not
value
statements,
but
a
value
stance. This arises from the fact that one identifies
oneself
with
a
certain
ecclesia
in
the
first
place... The experience or worship unifies group members
by
the
ritualized
presentation
of
a
system
of
meaning
that
includes
within
it
a
value
stance.
This
value
stance
is
encoded
in
the
network
of
consensual
value
statements
that
members
internalize
as
defining
characteristics
of
their
religious
community
and,
thus,
of
themselves.
They
may
differ
on
policies,
of
course,
because
policies
are
derived
from
substantive
not
consensual
value
statements."
[2]
The original meaning of the word "liturgy"
is
a
public
service
of
the
community. Our General Chapter should be, in that sense,
a
liturgy.
We
expect
it
to
produce
good
policies
for
the
Order.
We
expect
it
therefore
to
produce
a
good
number
of
specific
and
substantive
value
statements
that
can
lead
to
such
policies.
But
even
in
areas
where
this
is
not
yet
possible,
the
Chapter
should
not
shy
away
making
general
and
consensual
statements
that
will,
with
time,
either
generate
or
continue
to
foster
common
value
stances
that
can
weave
a
common
system
of
meaning
and
make
of
us
all
one
Cistercian
family. Several years ago I advocated a General Chapter
that
would
be
“prophetic”
rather
than
“juridical”. The next Summit Meeting will be, I hope, prophetic,
although
it
must
produce
legislation.
What
I
would
advocate
at
this
point,
in
the
light
of
what
I
just
said
above,
is
a
liturgical
General
Chapter.
Conyers,
August
19,
1987 Armand
Veilleux
[1]
See in particular Martin Van Buren, The Edges of Language,
[2]
Lawrence A. Hoffman, “Liturgical Basis for
Social
Policy:
A
Jewish
View”,
in
Liturgical
Foundations
of
Social
Policy
in
the
Catholic
and
Jewish
Traditions,
Daniel
F.
Polish
and
Eugene
J.
Fisher
eds.,
Univ.
of
N.D.
Press,
1983,
pp
161
and
162.
I
borrowed
many
insights
from
that
fine
article. |
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